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Police Legitimacy among Immigrants in Europe: Institutional Frames and Group Position 
 
Research on the antecedents of police legitimacy has begun to stress the relevance of a wide 
range of factors – beyond performance – in shaping public judgements of police (e.g. Jackson et 
al 2012; Antrobus et al 2015; Mehozay and Factor 2016; Weitzer and Tuch 2006). The ways in 
which people experience not just policing and but also their wider social, cultural and economic 
environment – and the location of both police and policed within structures of power, authority 
and affect – have important effects on lay judgements of police which, in turn, constitute the 
empirical legitimacy of this foundational state institution.  
In this paper we consider how holding one particular ‘location’ in society explains 
variation in people’s judgements of police legitimacy. We investigate the extent to which the 
socio-structural position and experiences of immigrants predicts attitudes towards the rightful 
authority of the police. The presence of growing immigrant populations in many European 
countries has become a topic of fierce political debate, which often revolves directly or 
indirectly around the bond between immigrants and the institutions of their new home 
(Anderson 2013). In particular, the relationship between the police and immigrant groups is 
frequently painted as being almost inevitably problematic. Immigrant populations are often 
young, economically disadvantaged and composed of people who, in the context within which 
they live, are from ethnic, racial and religious minorities: all characteristics known to predict 
negative experiences of police (Brown and Benedict 2002). The increasing criminalization of 
migration – or, at the very least, the well documented turn toward the use of criminal justice 
actors to regulate and control migration – adds another set of reasons for imagining immigrants 
will be at best wary of police (Weber 2011; Bowling and Marks 2015; Theodore and Habans 
2016). Theorists and commentators on, but also beyond, the political right have also argued that 
immigration undermines extant social and cultural norms, and a sense of shared community 
(e.g. Goodhart 2013; West 2013). Police garner trust and legitimacy when people feel a shared 
sense of belonging, inclusion, and shared values (Girling et al. 2000; Jackson et al 2012) but 
immigrants, it is claimed, are less likely to feel a sense of ‘social solidarity’ with those around 
them – and therefore with the police (c.f. Putnam 2007).  
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 Yet, the available evidence suggests a more nuanced picture. Strikingly, analysis of 
large-scale surveys such as the European Social Survey (ESS) (Röder and Mühlau 2012), the 
Crime Survey of England and Wales (Bradford et al. 2016), and World Values Survey 
(Nannestad et al. 2014) suggests that, at least in some contexts, immigrants’ views of the police 
can actually be more positive on average than those of their native-born counterparts. One 
possible explanation focuses on the change in ‘institutional frames’ that immigrants experience 
as they move from origin to destination countries. In a paper that foreshadowed the current 
contribution, Röder and Mühlau (2012) found that across 21 European countries, immigrants 
who had moved from high to low corruption countries had higher levels of trust in the police 
than the native-born (see also Röder and Mühlau 2011): immigrants may judge the 
trustworthiness of the police in the destination country partly on the basis of the 
(un)trustworthiness of the police in the origin country. 
 This paper advances the literature in three ways. First, we draw upon data from Round 5 
of the ESS, which contained an unusually rich collection of measures relating to police-public 
relations. The dataset used in this paper covers 27 countries, has a sample size of 52,458, and 
contains 4,962 first-generation immigrants hailing from a total of 166 countries. Second, we 
assess the relevance of institutional frames alongside important contextual factors. We include 
in our models a set of criminologically relevant variables as potential predictors of legitimacy – 
such as victimization and contact with the police – alongside measures of social and economic 
position and change in contexts association with migration. Third, while Röder and Muhlau 
(2012) addressed trust in the police, we consider legitimacy, a facet of public opinion often 
treated as a more proximate explanation for why people comply with the law and cooperate with 
the police – precisely the kinds of normative behaviour some argue that immigration 
undermines. 
Our overall goal is, then, to assess the extent to which a diverse range of factors explain 
variation in the legitimacy judgements of immigrants – and indeed non-immigrants – living in 
European countries. To anticipate our results, we find that change in institutional frames does 
seem to influence immigrant’s views of police. Broadly speaking, people who move from 
poorer countries with less effective justice systems to richer countries with more effective 
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justice systems tend to grant more legitimacy to the police in the destination country. Yet, like 
others, views of police among immigrant populations are influenced by personal contact with 
officers and position within vertical and horizontal structure of social ordering.  
  
What shapes police legitimacy among immigrants? 
Global flows of migration are complex (Abel and Sander 2014), but wherever they have moved 
from or too, and whatever push and pull forces are driving movement, a wide range of factors 
are likely to shape the legitimacy of the police among immigrant populations. These may 
include experiences of police (in destination and origin countries), the social and cultural 
characteristics of origin and destination countries, the strength of (and change in) affiliation 
with local, national and trans-national identities, and ideological stances toward institutions of 
order maintenance developed on one part of the world yet applied in another. In this paper we 
concentrate on three sets of variables that relate to people’s experiences of both policing and of 
being immigrants (or non-immigrants) in the county in which they reside: personal experience 
of police activity in the destination country; group position; and expectations or beliefs 
influenced by the change of institutional context associated with the act of immigration. A 
strand linking all three potentially important predictors of legitimacy is the idea that police 
represent dominant social categories, and indeed the state itself, a point we return to at several 
points in the discussion below. 
 
Contact with police 
Personal contact with officers is one of the most reliable predictors of opinions about the police. 
Cross-sectional (e.g. Van Damme et al. 2015), longitudinal (e.g. Tyler and Fagan 2008) and 
experimental studies (e.g. Mazerolle et al. 2013) have consistently identified strong associations 
between recent contact with police and measures of trust, legitimacy, propensity for future 
cooperation, and related constructs. The nature of this association is often ‘asymmetrical’ 
(Skogan 2006), with contacts with officers judged to be unsatisfactory seemingly having a large 
negative effect on people’s views of police, whereas those judged to be satisfactory tend to have 
a smaller (often much smaller) positive effect.  
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 Research into what makes an encounter with a police officer satisfactory or 
unsatisfactory has revealed almost equally consistent findings. Across a wide range of research 
settings, the assessment of the procedural fairness of police behaviour has been found to be the 
central predictor not only of satisfaction with the specific encounter but also wider views of 
police (Mazerolle et al. 2014). This finding, and its putative causes, is particularly pertinent in 
the present context. One reason why police fairness seems to be so important to the policed is 
that officers represent important social categories and identities within particular contexts. 
Through the way they treat people, police communicate powerful messages concerning 
inclusion, status and value within superordinate social categories, which have been 
characterized as associated with nation, state and citizenship (e.g. Loader and Mulcahy 2003). 
People tend to be sensitive to officer behavior and react particularly negatively to perceived 
unfairness, in part because police activity is identity relevant to them – it can serve to weaken, 
damage or even negate their sense of self and their idea of where they ‘fit’ in society (Parmar 
2011; Justice and Meares 2014). Officer activity can also bolster, or undermine, the claim police 
make to speak for and represent the policed (Stott et al. 2011). Policing perceived as unfair can 
create a sense that the values of police and those of the policed are in conflict; this, in turn, can 
serve to convince the latter that the police cannot claim to represent ‘people like them’. 
These processes form an important ‘bridge’ linking contact experiences with 
legitimacy: people are intensely attuned to the quality of officer behavior, making it salient in 
their wider judgements of police. And there is much to suggest that immigrant populations will 
have high levels of police contact, whether because police attention is concentrated on members 
of minority groups, a well-established phenomenon across multiple contexts (e.g. Adjami 2006; 
Goris et al. 2009; Tóth and Kádar 2012), or as a result of the increasingly blurred lines between 
immigration control, law and policing (‘crimmigration’ – Stumpf 2006; Weber 2011; Bowling 
and Marks 2015). Empirical evidence concerning levels of police contact among immigrants 
compared with non-immigrants is mixed, however, with some studies reporting that immigrants 
are indeed more likely to have contact with police (Provine and Sanchez 2011; Añón et al. 
2013; Theodore and Habans 2016) but others finding little or no association, or even that 
immigrants are less likely to have police contact (Davis and Hendricks 2007; Correia 2010).  
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Group position 
Weitzer (2010) argues that police-minority relationships are influenced not only by contacts 
between minority group members and police but also by the extent to which the former are 
incorporated into the wider society (see also Weitzer and Tuch 2006). This would seem to apply 
equally to immigrant groups. The manner and extent to which a particular group is incorporated 
– or ‘socially included’ – will likely have an important implications for members’ relations with 
police, not least because the police represent the dominant order and reflect back to people their 
status and value within it. Indeed, an individual’s relationship with police, as a specific state 
institution, seems likely to be imbricated with their relationship with the state in general. The 
legitimacy granted to one will reflect and refract the legitimacy granted to the other. 
Drawing on Bobo’s theory of group position (1999), Weitzer and Tuch (2006) extend 
this argument to include the objective characteristics of social groups and their location within 
cultural, political and economic hierarchies: group position will influence how group members 
conceive of institutions of social and political ordering. People will feel an affinity with those 
that serve their interests; members of groups that ‘do well’ out of current arrangements will tend 
to support the agencies tasked with maintaining them. By contrast members of socially excluded 
or marginalized groups will have less positive views of such institutions: the legitimacy of the 
police may suffer when people feel that the system ‘doesn’t work for them’ and may even be 
working against them. Moreover, the marginalization or exclusion of particular groups may 
trigger, for a variety of reasons, aggressive styles of policing that seek to control the tensions 
thus created – via higher levels of stop and search/frisk, for example – providing a link with the 
experiential factors outlined above. A key claim of this model is that once group position is 
taken into account, pairwise correlations between minority – or immigrant – status and views of 
the police should attenuate or even disappear. 
 Weitzer (2010: 130) identifies five potentially important groups of variables that may 
define the extent and form of a minority group’s incorporation within the wider social order:  
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 voluntariness of initial incorporation (which might be very different for a native 
Romanian Gypsy compared with a Parisian living in London);  
 socioeconomic status;  
 ethno-cultural orientation;  
 population size; and  
 political power. 
 
Variables associated with these factors will locate a group vertically within hierarchies of 
power, wealth, authority and influence; and horizontally within categories associated with 
nation, state and/or community. Vertical integration may predict differential experiences of 
police activity, most obviously via the well-established focus of police on those toward the 
bottom of the economic and political hierarchies, while horizontal integration may predict 
relations with police in a more symbolic sense. Since police are ‘proto-typical’ (Sunshine and 
Tyler 2003) group representatives, police legitimacy is influenced by identification with the 
group concerned (Oliveira and Murphy 2014). Members of groups that are associated more 
strongly with dominant social categories seem likely, all else equal, to grant police more 
legitimacy; not necessarily because they gain in an instrumental sense from their position within 




The final set of factors that may explain the legitimacy judgments of immigrants (versus native-
born and in comparison with immigrants from different countries) is the change in institutional 
frames – or ‘frames of reference’ (Röder and Mühlau 2012) – they experience as a result of the 
act of migration. When individuals move to a new context they may view the police, and other 
state institutions, through a lens developed in their country of origin. Alternatively, the extent to 
which they grant legitimacy to institutions in the destination country may be predicted by the 
quality of those institutions in comparison to equivalent institutions in their country of origin 
(Dinesen 2012; Nannestad et al. 2014). People who move from countries with corrupt, 
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inefficient police services may continue to view police in their destination country as corrupt 
and inefficient because that is the way they have been socialized to view police (Harris 2006); 
or, by contrast, they may compare the police in their new home favourably with those they 
experienced before. The lens people use to view police may also concern the wider ability of the 
state to protect and properly serve its citizens. Indeed, because police are not merely part of the 
state apparatus but also represent it in embodied form, their legitimacy may be particularly 
likely to be influenced by wider perceptions of state performance and the general condition of 
society. 
This last idea chimes with existing research on the predictors of police legitimacy and 
public opinions of policing. Perceptions of the general level of corruption in country, for 
example, have been linked to views of the police (Thomassen 2013), as has ‘system 
satisfaction’ (Thomassen and Kääriänen 2016) and perceptions of government performance 
(Bradford et al. 2014). On a more local or visceral level, research in the US and UK has found 
that neighbourhood conditions – the extent of low level disorder, the strength of community 
cohesion – are strong predictors of police legitimacy (Jackson et al. 2013; Nix et al. 2015) as 
well as wider views of police (Sampson and Bartusch 1998). On this account, when local order 
seems well-established and strong the police, representatives of that order, gain public trust and 
legitimacy (Jackson and Bradford 2009). Nor should we forget arguably more instrumental 
concerns about safety. Successes – and failures – in dealing with problems of crime, and 
perhaps particularly violent crime, might also influence people’s perceptions of police. It seems 
entirely plausible to suggest that moving from a more violent to a less violent society may well 
have an effect on one’s views of the police. 
  There is some evidence that the change in institutional frames associated with 
migration influence views of the police, the weight of which seems to suggest that moving from 
a ‘worse’ to a ‘better’ institutional context is associated with an uplift in opinions. Röder and 
Mühlau (2012) found that having moved from a more to a less corrupt country was associated, 
on average, with more favourable views of police, while Bradford et al. (2016) found that 
immigrants from Africa and South Asia (many of whom will have come from countries with 
highly corrupt police and political systems) living in England and Wales trusted the police 
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significantly more than non-immigrants. Nannestad et al. (2014) report similar findings, and 
conclude that better ‘quality’ institutions in destination countries (in their case, Denmark) is 




Drawing together the discussion above we hypothesize that immigrants will on average grant 
the police more legitimacy than non-immigrants (H1). We also hypothesize that experiences of 
police (H2) and group position (H3) will also predict police legitimacy, as will any change in 
institutional frames associated with the act of immigration (H4). And, once these factors are 
taking into account, we predict that the association between immigrant status and legitimacy 
will be attenuated (H5). We suggest, that is, that one reason why immigrants have different 
views of the police is that, compared with non-immigrants, they are located differently within 
the social order and have views of policing that are conditioned, in part, by comparisons with 
police and other institutions in their countries of origin.  
 
Data and measures 
Data 
We draw on data from the ESS – a social survey designed to chart and explain the interaction 
between Europe’s changing institutions and the attitudes, beliefs, and behaviour patterns of its 
diverse populations (www.europeansocialsurvey.org). The survey is widely seen to be the 
highest quality cross-European survey. Although not all countries achieve it, the aspiration is 
that all should have probability samples of the adult (15 plus) population, with high response 
rates, interviewed face-to-face using CAPI (computer assisted personal interviewing). We draw 
primarily on the ‘trust in justice’ module included in Round 5 of the ESS, as well as items from 
elsewhere in the dataset made available to researchers. Fieldwork for Round 5 of the ESS was 
done in 2010/11; 28 countries took part; and a dataset of 27 countries became available in early 
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2012.
1
 It should be noted that, while patterns of immigration and policing may of course have 
developed since 2010/2011, this is a rare opportunity to estimate important patterns of 
relationships in 27 countries – and the rotating module on trust in justice has not yet ‘rotated’ 
(i.e. it has been fielded only once so far). 
 We should also note the level of analysis. Our analysis focuses on broad, aggregate 
patterns at the general population level of 27 countries. It is, therefore, about establishing some 
high-level phenomenon, for future studies to build upon and flesh out. Perhaps an example 
helps. In the UK we have seen general population surveys capturing patterns of police-citizen 
contact and the dynamics of procedural justice and legitimacy (Bradford et al. 2009; Jackson et 
al. 2012). This work has set the context for more focused analysis on the neighbourhood context 
of police-contact and legitimacy across London (Jackson et al. 2013) and the zooming in on 
certain special populations (e.g. young males from various ethnicities in certain deprived 
London localities, see Jackson et al. 2013, and a small number of contrasting neighbourhoods, 
Bradford & Jackson, 2016).  
 
Measuring police legitimacy  
We take a dual component approach to measuring police legitimacy, such that we have two 
outcome variables for analysis (Jackson et al., 2012; Hough et al., 2013; Jackson 2015). On this 
account, the police can be said to be empirically legitimate when citizens believe (a) officers 
wield their power in normatively appropriate ways (reflecting the sense that their power is 
normatively justified) and (b) that they as, citizens of a given political community, have a 
positive moral duty to obey police instructions (reflecting the sense that the institution has 
rightful authority and is therefore entitled to be obeyed).  
Three survey items tapped, first, into respondent’s sense of normative alignment with 
police—the extent to which they believed that police act according to societal expectations 
regarding appropriate conduct. Asking people to agree or disagree with statements such as ‘I 
generally support suspect how the police usually act’ tries to capture a series of linked 
                                                        
1
 Data for the final country, Austria, were only made available much later and are excluded from the 
analysis presented here. 
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propositions: first, that there are societal values regarding how legal authorities should wield 
their authority; second, that citizens’ judgements about the moral right to power of legal 
authorities revolve largely around the extent to which institutional actors are seen to act in ways 
that shows respect for these societal values; and third, that when people believe that legal 
authorities act appropriately, this reflects both the belief that the institution has the right to 
power and consequently that they, as citizens, should act in normatively appropriate ways 
(Jackson, 2015).  
Three further items tapped into respondents’ sense that they had a moral duty to obey 
the instructions of police officers (e.g. ‘To what extent is it your moral duty to back the 
decisions made by police even when you disagree with them?’). This component of legitimacy 
therefore relates to classic conceptions concerned with the ability of authorities to command 
willing obedience.  
Police legitimacy can be defined in terms of reflective measurement, where it is 
assumed to be an unobservable psychological construct that can be measured by indirect 
indices, and that variation in such behavioural/attitudinal indicators can be attributed to 
variation in the underlying psychological construct. But such scales can also be approached in a 
formative way – by taking, that is, a more pragmatic approach in which answers to the various 
questions can be combined in some manner to constitute (to form not reflect) the construct of 
interest. Multiple deprivation and socio-economic status are classic examples of concepts that 
are lend themselves well to formative measurement. The UK’s index of multiple deprivation 
captures levels of neighbourhood deprivation along seven different dimensions, with a weighted 
mean produced to form the overall index. The idea is here deprivation is not one unobservable 
latent property of a neighbourhood, causing joint variation in each of its seven dimensions. 
Instead, each of the seven dimensions can be sensibly measured using various official statistics, 
and it is useful to aggregate them together for various policy reasons. 
Another example of formative measurement is fear of crime. For instance, one could 
pragmatically form a number of different categories of fear (differentiating between functional 
fear and dysfunctional fear, for instance, see Jackson & Gray, 2010) to simplify analysis on a 
number of different levels. In this paper we take a formative approach – for each respondent we 
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take the mean of the three indicators for each of normative alignment and duty to obey – 
because it represents a pragmatic and straightforward way to address issues of (cross-national) 
measurement equivalence. We assume, that is, that police legitimacy within a particular country 
(and across the 27 countries included in the analysis) can be assessed by taking the mean of the 
three indicators available for each component, and that the resulting indicator has the same 




Potential predictors of police legitimacy 
Immigrant status was included in the models as a set of dummy variables, with native-born as 
the reference category. The dummy variables variously represent (a) whether the respondent 
was a ‘second generation immigrant’ (i.e. both their parents had been born abroad), (b) whether 
they had arrived in their country of residence aged under 16, and (c) if they had arrived as adults 
the number of years since their first arrival (less than five, five to ten, 10 to 15, 15 to 20, and 
over 20). This design allows us to distinguish between those born into ‘immigrant 
communities’, those who migrated as children (the ‘1.5 generation’ (Rumbaut 1994), and those 
who migrated as adults, and thus to take some account of the fact that immigration is not a 
‘state’ but a ‘process’ through which people move. 
Experience of policing. ESS respondents were asked, first, if police in their country had 
approached, stopped or made contact with them for any reason in the last two years; second, 
they were asked how satisfied they were with the conduct of the police on the last occasion this 
occurred (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics). Police contact was entered into the models as 
three dummy variables, representing satisfactory contact, neutral contact, and unsatisfactory 
contact (the reference category was ‘no contact’). 
Group position. Five measures of group position were included our models (see, again, 
Table 1). All concern the extent of political and socio-economic incorporation; the first three, 
however, relate more clearly to horizontal incorporation: the extent to which people feel they 
‘belong’. First, a binary indicator represented whether an individual was a citizen of the country 
                                                        
3 Normative alignment (mean 2.46; SD .79; min 1; max 5); duty to obey (mean 5.65; SD 2.61; min 0; 
max 10). 
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in which they lived. Second, to measure experience of ethnic discrimination answers to a range 
of questions were combined into a binary indicator, which was coded 1 if a respondent indicated 
they were members of a group discriminated against on the grounds of colour or race, 
nationality, religion, language, or ethnic group. Third, voting behaviour was also captured by 
two dummy variables. The first was coded 1 if a respondent did not vote in the last national 
election because they were not eligible to vote, while the second was coded 1 if the respondent 
did not vote in the last election but was eligible to vote (the reference category was therefore 
‘voted in the last national election’). Disengagement from political activity is a well-recognized 
indicator of social exclusion (Burchardt et al. 1999|). 
 The remaining measures of group position relate primarily to vertical incorporation and, 
specifically, to economic security. Unemployment captures the objective experience of being 
outside paid employment. Coping on income, by contrast, captures the subjective experience of 
economic insecurity as well as its mere existence. ESS respondents were asked “Which of these 
descriptions … comes closest to how you feel about your households income nowadays?”, with 
the possible responses set as: ‘living comfortably on present income’; ‘coping on present 
income’; finding it difficult on present income’; and ‘ finding it very difficult on present 
income’. Responses to this item were entered into our models as a set of three dummy variables, 
with the reference category set as ‘living comfortably’. 
 
Institutional frames. Three measures were used to tap into how change in institutional context 
might shape immigrants assessments of police legitimacy. The first concerned corruption and 
the rule of law, and here we draw on, and extend, the measure used by Röder and Mühlau 
(2012). If, as they argue, “immigrants compare the institutional reality of the host country with 
their experiences of institutions in the home country as a reference point” (ibid: 376), it seems 
likely that the ‘institutional reality’ of law and corruption is a particularly salient factor in 
relation to the police. Two components of the World Bank’s ‘Worldwide Governance 
Indicators’ (WGI)4 were obtained: the indices of Control of Corruption and Rule of Law, 
covering the period 1996-2009. Aggregating data derived from multiple sources, such as 
                                                        
4
 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc 
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surveys of individuals and businesses and reports from NGOs, into an overall country-level 
index, the control of corruption index is intended to capture “perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, 
as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests” (World Bank 2015a). The 
similarly derived rule of law index is intended to capture “perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence” (World Bank 2015b). These two indicators were selected from the set of 
six WGI indicators as those most likely to frame perceptions of the police. 
 For inclusion in our models the raw scales were transformed thus. First, the average of 
across the period 1996-2009 was calculated for each country.
5
 The resulting country-level 
measures of corruption and rule of law were extremely highly correlated (.97), so the mean was 
taken to create a country level measure of law and corruption. Each respondent in the dataset 
was then assigned two values for this measure, one for their country of birth and one for their 
country of residence. A measure of change in law and corruption was then created by 
subtracting the value for country of birth from that of country of residence (mean .11; SD .46; 
min -2.81; max 4.22). Non-immigrants by definition scored zero on this measure; a positive 
score indicates that an individual moved from a more corrupt country were the rule of law was 
less well established to a less corrupt country where the rule of law was better established. 
Among immigrants the mean value was 1.18, indicating that immigrant respondents tended to 
have moved from more to less corrupt countries. Note that this is an individual level indicator, a 
point we return to in the discussion. 
The second measure of immigrants’ frame of reference was calculated in a similar way. 
To assess how change in the level of crime might affect views of the police subsequent to 
migrating, homicide (murders per 100,000 population) data for the period 1995-2009 was 
obtained from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime International Homicide Statistics database.
6
 
The average murder rate for each country was again calculated, and after mean-centering the 
                                                        
5
 Where data coverage was partial the mean was calculated using the available years. 
6
 http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/ 
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resulting scores a measure of change in the murder rate was calculated for each respondent 
(mean -.29; SD 2.4; min -53.24; max 9.61). A negative score on this measure indicates that a 
respondent moved from a country with a higher murder rate to one with a lower murder rate – 
the mean for immigrants was -3.4, indicating that on average immigrants moved from more to 
less violent countries. 
Finally, a measure of change in GDP per capita (in current US dollars) was also 
calculated, again using data from the World Bank. The years 1996 to 2009 were selected to 
match the timeframes used for the other variables, and the mean for each country was taken. A 
change variable was then created as before (mean 1,433, SD 6,447; min -63,123; max 55,215). 
A positive score on the change in GDP measures indicates that a respondent moved from a 
poorer to a richer country. For immigrants the mean of this measure was 15,883 – immigrants 
moved on average from poorer to richer countries. 
Clearly, many immigrant respondents in the ESS migrated before 1996, and there must 
be some doubt about the validity of the measures described above for those who had spent a 
long time in the destination country by the time of interview. However relative levels of 
corruption (Kaufman et al. 2010) and homicide (Lafree and Tseloni 2006) are generally stable 
over time, suggesting that variables estimating change between origin and destination countries 
may have greater validity for longer-term immigrants than would otherwise have been the case. 
 
Control variables 
An important control variable was ethnic minority status, which was based on a question that 
simply asked respondents “Do you belong to a minority ethnic group in (this country)?” (1=yes; 
0=no). Models also controlled for gender, age (entered as two dummy variables to avoid 
collinearity with the ‘length of stay’ measure), religion, level of education (years in full-time 
education) and crime victimization. 
 
Analytic strategy 
We start with a descriptive analysis of the experiences of policing and ‘group positions’ of 
immigrants compared with non-immigrants. In the main modelling we use a two-level multi-
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level model to account for the clustering of individuals within countries, and the fact that 
perceptions of legitimacy varied between countries. A random effects model allows us to 
partition between-individual and between-country variance, meaning that we can assess the 
extent to which individual-level predictors explain variation in individual-level perceived 




Table 1 shows that across the 27 countries included in the analysis immigrants were somewhat 
less likely to have experienced police-initiated contact in the past two years. Yet 2
nd
 generation 
immigrants, and those who had arrived as children, were more likely to have experienced 
unsatisfactory police contact (indicating that when these groups did have contact with police 
they were more likely to judge it unsatisfactory). 
Immigrants were also clearly more likely to have a less favourable ‘group position’ than 
non-immigrants, being: less likely to be citizens; more likely to choose not to vote; more likely 
to be unemployed, and more likely to be finding it hard to get by. 
 
Regression analysis 
Results from a series of random effects models predicting normative alignment with police are 
shown in Table 2. At the bivariate level there was an association between immigrant status and 
this component of legitimacy (Model 1). Compared with the native-born population, immigrants 
who had arrived as children, and people whose parents were immigrants, tended to feel less 
normatively aligned with police; yet immigrants who had arrived between 5 and 15 years ago 
tended to feel more normatively aligned. Model 2 in Table adds the control variables. The 
inclusion of controls had relatively little influence on the immigration-legitimacy relationship, 
although note that the negative coefficient for ‘arrived more than 20 years ago’ strengthens and 
achieves statistical significance. 
 Models 3-5 add the three groups of explanatory variables individually, while Model 6 
adds all together. Almost all were statistically significant predictors of police legitimacy (which 
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is hardly surprising given the sample size involved). Across the European population as a 
whole, those with less favourable group positions – who experienced discrimination, who chose 
not to vote at the last election, who were unemployed and struggled to manage on their incomes 
– tended to grant the police in their country less legitimacy. A notable exception was citizenship 
– all else equal non-citizens, perhaps unexpectedly, tended to grant police more legitimacy than 
citizens. As expected, recent contact with officers was also strongly associated with legitimacy, 
with unsatisfactory contact having a larger statistical effect than satisfactory contact. 
Perhaps most striking, though, are the measures of institutional frames. When added 
alone (Model 5) none were significant predictors of normative alignment. Yet, conditional on 
contact with police and group position in Model 6, we find that people who moved from more 
to less corrupt countries, and from poorer to richer countries, tended to feel more normatively 
aligned with the police in their destination country. By contrast, there was a small but 
significant positive statistical effect associated with moving from a country with a lower murder 
rate to one with a higher rate – those who moved from a less to a more violent country seemed 
to be more inclined to support police in their new home.
7
 All else being equal, it may be that the 
experience of a new, more violent context prompts somewhat more positive views of police as 
potential protection from that violence. 
 Finally, once all the explanatory variables were present in Model 6, any positive 
association between immigrant status and normative alignment was broken. It seems this was 
entirely explained by the other variables in the model. However the negative associations 
remain, and controlling for all the variables in Model 6 second generation immigrants, those 
who arrived as children, and those who arrived as adults over 15 years ago granted the police 
less legitimacy than their native born counterparts.  
 Table 3 shows the results from models that repeat the above process for the duty to 
obey component of legitimacy. Model 1 shows that, again, there was a significant association 
between being an immigrant and the perceived duty to obey police. Those who had arrived less 
than 15 years ago tended to feel a stronger duty to obey police; here, however, those who 
arrived as children, and second generation immigrants, did not on average feel differently to 
                                                        
7 Note that this effect only arose conditional on the other two institutional frame measures – absent these there was no 
association between the change in murder rate and legitimacy measures. 
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their native-born counterparts. Model 2 adds control variables, which again have little effect on 
the measures of immigrant status (although note that the negative coefficient for ‘arrived 15-20 
years ago achieves significance in this model). 
 Model 3-6 in Table 3 adds the three groups of explanatory variables. The findings in 
relation to police contact and group position are very similar to before, the one exception being 
that the experience of discrimination had no unique association with perceived duty to obey. 
However of the institutional frame measures only change in GDP was significant – people who 
had moved from poorer to rich countries tended to feel a greater duty to obey police in the 
destination country. Also as above, any positive association between immigrant status and duty 
to obey was broken by the introduction of the other explanatory variables. Indeed, once the 
other variables in Model 6 were taken into account a more negative association between 
immigrant status and this component of legitimacy emerged, particularly in relation to those 
immigrants who had arrived as children.  
 
Discussion 
Five hypotheses guided the analysis above. H1 found some support, in that some groups of 
immigrants, those who had arrived as adults less than 15 years ago, did indeed grant the police 
more legitimacy. However others, most notably those who had arrived as children, granted on 
average less legitimacy. The partial positive association between immigrant status and 
legitimacy was robust to a (admittedly limited) range of control variables. But upon the 
introduction of the measures of police contact, group position and change in institutional frames 
– measures that as predicted were all associated with police legitimacy (H2-H4) – any positive 
association between immigrant status and legitimacy was broken (H5).
8
 Moreover, conditional 
on these variables a more robustly negative association between immigrant status and 
legitimacy became apparent.  
 In line with other emerging work we find, then, that a range of factors come together in 
influencing the legitimacy of police. What the police do is important – as reflected by the 
                                                        
8
 We also tested for the idea that police contact might be differentially important for immigrants 
compared with non-immigrants. Results demonstrated that the association between contact with police 
and legitimacy was largely invariant across the two categories. 
  18 
statistical effects of the contact variables in our models – but so is the social and economic 
position which people find themselves, and the shift in institutional contexts experienced by 
immigrants. People who are economically and socially excluded, or at least who do less well 
out of the extant system of socially ordering, tend to grant the police less legitimacy. By 
contrast, those who have moved from poorer, more corrupt countries with less well functioning 
criminal justice systems to richer, less corrupt countries with better performing justice systems 
seem to compare the police in their new home favourably with police where they came from, 
leading all else equal to more positive judgements about the values guiding police and a 
stronger sense of duty to obey their instructions. On average, immigrants do not ‘import’ 
negative views of state institutions formed in their countries of origin, but rather react positively 
to a new, ‘better’ institutional framework (c.f. Nannestad et al. 2014). Taken together with the 
finding that the views of recent immigrants did not differ from those of non-immigrants, our 
results therefore suggest that immigration, in and of itself, does not undermine police legitimacy 
(at least to the extent that migrant flows are from countries with weaker institutions to those 
where they are stronger).  
 Yet, net of the effects of institutional frames, personal experiences of police and group 
position, some groups of immigrants, particularly those who had arrived as children, tended to 
grant the police somewhat less legitimacy than non-immigrants. There are two mutually 
compatible interpretations of this finding. The first is that immigrant status was serving as a 
proxy for some other aspect of experience, for example other forms of personal, vicarious or 
mediated contact with the police, which were not covered in our models. Second, it may be that 
there is something about growing up as an immigrant child that in and of itself serves, on 
average, to alienate people from institutions such as the police. This process may have much to 
do with the complicated and often fraught process of identity formation child immigrants (and 
children of immigrants) go through as they navigate their relationship with dominant and 
subaltern ethnic and national groups (Rumbout 1994; Tartakovsky 2008) – and the role police 
can play in such processes. The extent to which police represent dominant groups, for example, 
may shape the legitimacy judgements of those from the ‘1.5 generation’ who self-categorize 
more strongly as minority or marginal. An obvious implication here is that immigrant status is 
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itself an element of ‘group position’ that has an effect on people’s relationships with important 
state institutions such as the police. 
 There are of course further limitations to our analysis. First, we have by necessity 
treated the experience of immigration as a characteristic of individuals, but there are likely to be 
important social or cultural aspects of this experience that attach more properly to families 
and/or other social groups. Collective experiences, particularly in the destination country, might 
have implications for the legitimacy members of such communities grant to police. Second, 
while our analysis partialled out country-level factors (and could not take account of local 
factors), variation in the ‘reception’ of immigrants at national and sub-national levels may also 
be an important factor shaping their relations with police. Third, and cutting across everything 
else, we have not been able to take account of the reasons for migration. The ESS data do not 
record why immigrants moved from one country to another – e.g. as a student, worker, family 
member or refugee – and variation in migration experiences seems likely to have an important 
effect on relations with police in the destination country. Further work – which drills down into 
local contexts and experiences – will be needed to see if these and related factors are associated 
with legitimacy judgments. 
 
Conclusions 
The analysis presented in this paper demonstrates the diverse range of factors that shape the 
legitimacy of the police among the policed. Contact with the police and group position, as well 
as demographic factors, were correlated with legitimacy, as was change in institutional frames 
associated with migration. The idea that the police are not only a key component of the state but 
also represent and indeed embody it is therefore supported by the ESS data. Legitimacy is 
shaped not only by people’s direct contacts with officers but also by the extent to which the 
wider state – or, perhaps, society – is successful in integrating its members and securing social 
and economic goods for them. Concerns about the institutional effect of what immigrants ‘bring 
with them’ seem, on this basis, to be misplaced – the primary factors shaping their views of the 
police are their experiences in their new home. 
 While the primary emphasis of this paper has been theoretical there are therefore some 
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important policy lessons here. On the one hand, efforts to enhance police legitimacy, which 
concern policy-makers in many jurisdictions, seem unlikely to succeed if they are applied in a 
way that ignores contextual factors. Due to the symbolic meanings attached to police, and the 
affective links people draw between police and wider social and political categories, it is 
arguable that police legitimacy cannot be ‘improved’ without also attending to deeper structural 
inequalities that shape people’s relations with the state and their fellow citizens (and/or denizens 
– Hammar 1990). At the very least, since the structure of public feelings toward police is highly 
complex – there are many ‘pillars’ of legitimacy – policy-makers cannot simply expect to 
‘throw a switch’ in efforts to enhance police legitimacy. On the other hand, though, moments of 
personal contact with police officers still matter. Indeed, precisely because of the symbolic 
meaning of policing it is possible that people’s stances toward the wider society may be 
influenced by their interactions with such important representatives of it. Most pertinently in the 
current context, a key moment in which immigrants establish a sense of place and belonging in 
their new home – or are inhibited in doing so – may be encounters with police officers, who 
communicate to them authoritative messages about their inclusion, status and value within this 
new environment (Loader and Mulcahy 2003; Justice and Meares 2014). The dynamic 
relationship between the structural and interactional processes affecting police legitimacy is 
likely to have important implications not only for the relationship between the police and 
policed but also how the latter experience the social context within which they live. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
    
      
















Experience of policing 
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No police-initiated contact in last 2 years 67 70 66 70 67 
Yes and unsatisfactory 7 9 9 7 7 
Yes and neutral 5 4 5 4 5 
Yes and satisfactory 21 16 19 20 21 
      
Group position 
     
Experience of discrimination 2 8 9 12 3 
Citizen of country 99 91 84 53 96 
Eligible to vote but did not 21 24 26 30 22 
Not eligible to vote 5 12 13 28 7 
Unemployed 8 9 10 11 8 
Finding it difficult/very difficult to get by 27 35 39 58 29 
      
Ethnicity 
     
Member of ethnic minority 4 17 17 28 6 
      
Legitimacy judgements (scale means) 
     
Normative alignment 3.5 3.3 3.4 3.6 3.5 
Duty to obey 5.9 6.3 6.0 6.2 5.9 
      
n 46,319 1,524 1,719 3,211 52,773 
Source: ESS round 5 





      Random effects linear regression models predicting normative alignment with police 
       
  
     
Stanadardized 
betas 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Immigrant status (ref: native born) 
      
2nd generation -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
1st generation, arrived as child -0.01** -0.01* -0.01* -0.01 -0.01 -0.02*** 
1st generation, adult, arrived <5 years ago 0 0.01 0.01 0.01* 0.01+ 0 
1st generation, adult, arrived 5-10 years ago 0.01** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01 
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1st generation, adult, arrived 10-15 years ago 0.01** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01 
1st generation, adult, arrived 15-20 years ago 0 0 0 0.01 0 -0.01*   
1st generation, adult, arrived >20 years ago 0 -0.01* -0.01* -0.01 -0.01 -0.03*** 
Age (ref: <50) 
      
50-70 
 
0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 
Over 70 
 
0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 
Gender (ref: male) 
      
Female 
 
0.01** 0 0.01** 0.01** 0 
Years in full-time education 
 
0.02*** 0.01** -0.01** 0.02*** -0.01 
Member of ethnic minority (ref: no) 
      
Yes 
 
-0.01+ -0.01 0.01* -0.01 -0.01 
Religion (ref: Christian) 
      
Atheist/agnostic/does not belong 
 
-0.08*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.04*** 
Muslim 
 
0.01 0.01+ 0.01** 0.01+ 0 
Other 
 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01* -0.01 -0.05*** 
Victim of crime (ref: no) 
      
Yes 
 
-0.06*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.03*** 
Experience of police 
      
Contact with police (ref: no) 
      
















      
Experience of discrimination (ref: no) 
      
Yes 




Citizen of country (ref: no) 
      
Yes 




Voted at last election (ref: yes) 
      
Eligible but did not vote 









Employment status (ref: others) 
      
Unemployed 




Coping on income (ref: living comfortably) 
      
Coping 




Finding it difficult 




Finding it very difficult 




Change in institutional frames 
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Law and corruption 
    
0 0.04*** 
Murder rate 
    
0 0.01*   
GDP per capita 
    
-0.01 0.02*   
       
ICC 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.00 
       
n 48581 48581 48581 48581 48581 48581 
+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
       
  
  28 
Table 3 
      Random effects linear regression models predicting perceived duty to obey 
police 
       Stanadardized betas 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Immigrant status (ref: native born) 
      2nd generation 0 -0.01 0 0 -0.01 0 
1st generation, arrived as child -0.01 -0.01+ -0.01 -0.01 0 -0.02*** 
1st generation, arrived <5 years ago 0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 0.01** 0 
1st generation, arrived 5-10 years ago 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.02*** 0 
1st generation, arrived 10-15 years ago 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.02** 0 
1st generation, arrived 15-20 years ago -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0 0 -0.01*   
1st generation, arrived >20 years ago 0.01* 0 0 0 0.01 -0.01*   
Age (ref: <50) 
      
50-70 
 
0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
Over 70 
 
0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 
Gender (ref: male) 
      
Female 
 
0 0 0 0 0 
Years in full-time education 
 
0 0 -0.01* 0 -0.02*** 
Member of ethnic minority (ref: no) 
      
Yes 
 
0 0 0.01 0 -0.02*** 
Religion (ref: Christian) 
      
Atheist/agnostic/does not belong 
 
-0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.04*** 
Muslim 
 
0.02** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
Other 
 
0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.06*** 
Victim of crime (ref: no) 
      
Yes 
 
-0.03*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.01**  
Experience of police 
      
Contact with police (ref: no) 
      
















      
Experience of discrimination (ref: no) 





      
Citizen of country (ref: no) 
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Yes 
      
Voted at last election (ref: yes) 
      
Eligible but did not vote 









Employment status (ref: others) 
      
Unemployed 




Coping on income (ref: living comfortably) 
      
Coping 




Finding it difficult 




Finding it very difficult 




Change in institutional frames 
      
Law and corruption 
    
-0.02+ 0 
Murder rate 
    
-0.01 -0.01 
GDP per capita 
    
0 0.03**  
       
ICC 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.00 
       
n 48145 48145 48145 48145 48145 48145 
+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
       
 
